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Abstract
Approval Voting is shown to be the unique scoring rule that leads strategic voters
to sincere behavior of three candidates elections in Poisson Games. However, Approval
Voting can lead to insincere behavior in elections with more than three candidates.
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11 Introduction
A standard assumption in the voting literature is that voters vote strategically: they cast
the ballot that maximizes their expected utility. Among the diﬀerent voting rules, the
strategic voting literature (which aims at comparing voting rules by the set of equilibria
they lead to) has mainly focused on scoring rules due to their simple structure. With a
scoring rule, the voter assigns a number of points to each of the candidates. Among these
scoring rules, the most studied ones are Plurality voting (PV) in which a voter can cast a
single vote for at most one candidate and Approval Voting (AV) in which a voter can give
one or zero votes independently to each of the candidates.
The criteria used within this work to diﬀerentiate between the diﬀerent scoring rules
is sincerity. We say that a ballot is sincere if, given the score s assigned to given candidate
k, the scores assigned to candidates preferred to k are greater or equal than s. Our main
purpose is to identify whether there exists any scoring rule under which strategic voting
leads to sincere voting. This indeed the case in elections with three candidates: under AV ,
voters’ best responses are always sincere in equilibrium. To do so, we focus on Poisson
voting games, games with a random number of voters proposed by Myerson[9, 10]1. Yet,
the most interesting feature is not that AV is sincere in such a framework (which was
already true with other types of equilibria reﬁnements such as trembling-hand perfection
or elimination of weakly undominated strategies). Thanks to the use of Poisson Games
(which are more trackable than standard reﬁnements), we are able to show that any other
scoring rule may lead to insincere behavior at equilibrium. However, this positive result
concerning AV is only valid in elections with three candidates. Indeed, an example of an
election with four candidates is provided in which sincerity is not anymore ensured.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. Section 3
discusses in detail the sincerity of AV and Section 4 proves that the other scoring rules
may not lead to sincerity at equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
A Poisson random variable P(n) is a discrete probability distribution that depends on
a unique parameter which represents its mean. The probability that a Poisson random




1Few papers deal with the properties of these new games: see Bouton and Castanheira [1], Goertz and
Maniquet [5], De Sinopoli [4], Krishna and Morgan [6], Nu~ nez[11, 12].
2A Poisson voting Game of expected size n is a game such that the actual number of
voters taking part in the election is a random variable drawn from a Poisson distribution
with mean n. This assumption represents the uncertainty faced by voters w.r.t. the
number of voters that show up the day of the election. The probability distribution and
its parameter n are common knowledge.
Each voter has a type t in set of types T that deﬁnes his cardinal preferences over the
set of candidates K. A voter’s payoﬀ only depends on the candidate who is elected. The
preferences of a voter with a type t are denoted by ut = (ut(k))k2K. Thus, for a given
t, ut(j) > ut(k) implies that t-voters strictly prefer candidate j to candidate k. Each
voter’s type is independently drawn from T according to the distribution of types denoted
by r = (r(t))t2T
2. In other words, r(t) represents the probability that a voter randomly
drawn from the population has type t.
A ﬁnite Poisson game of expected size n is then represented by (K;T;n;r;u). The
expression “Large Poisson game” or LPG refers to the asymptotic behavior of a sequence
of Poisson games of expected size n when n is large enough.
In order to completely determine an election in a Poisson voting game, the voting rule
remains to be speciﬁed. The focus of this paper is on scoring rules on the framework of
three candidate elections. Following Myerson [10], we denote a generalized scoring rule in
a three candidates election as a voting rule in which




at most 1 point to one candidate;
at least 0 points to another candidate and
s points with s ∈ [s;s] to the remaining candidate;
with the convention that 0 ≤ s ≤ s ≤ 1. In the literature (for instance, see the ax-
iomatization of Young [13]), most used ranked scoring rules satisfy s = s: for instance,
Plurality voting (with s = s = 0), the Borda rule (s = s = 1=2) and Negative voting
(with s = s = 1). There also exists non ranked scoring rules when s < s such as Approval
Voting in which 0 = s < s = 1. The set of available ballots is denoted by C.
As shown by Myerson [8], assuming a Poisson population has two main advantages:
common public information and independence of actions. This common public information
property of Poisson Games entails that voters’ actions uniquely depend on their private
information t on this type of games in equilibrium. The second main advantage is usually
referred as the independence of actions. The number of voters who choose a given ballot
is independent from the number of voters who choose another ballot as a consequence of
assuming that the number of voters is drawn from a Poisson random variable.
2The distribution of types satises r(t)  0 8 t 2 T and
∑
t2T r(t) = 1.
3We represent voters’ actions by the strategy function (c|t) 3 which is a function from




t  −→ (: | t):
A voter with type t chooses ballot c with probability (c | t). Then, taking into
account the distribution of types r and the strategy function (: | t), the vote distribution





The vote distribution  represents the share of votes each ballot gets. We denote by
x(c) the Poisson random variable with parameter n(c) that describes the number of voters
who choose ballot c. Furthermore the vote prole x = (x(c))c2C is a vector of length C of
independent random variables (due to the independent actions property).
The set of electoral outcomes is denoted by B, where
B = {b ∈ RC | b(c) is a non-negative integer for all c ∈ C}
We denote by b ∈ B a vector of length C of non-negative integer numbers. Each compo-
nent b(c) of vector b accounts for the number of voters who vote for ballot c.
Given the vote proﬁle x, the (common knowledge) probability that the outcome is
equal to a vector b ∈ B is such that








Let Ck denote the set of ballots in which candidate k is approved. Given the vote proﬁle
x, the score distribution  = ((k))k2K describes the share of votes that each candidate





It follows that the number of voters that vote for a candidate k is drawn from a Poisson
random variable with mean n(k). Given the score distribution, we deﬁne the score prole





3The strategy function satises (cjt)  0 8c 2 C and
∑
d2C (djt) = 1. It plays the role of a strategy
combination in a game with a constant number of players.
4Given the vector b ∈ B, let M(b) = argmaxj2K (j) denote the set of candidates with
the most points. Assuming a fair toss of a coin, the probability of candidate k winning
the election given the vector b ∈ B is
W[k | b] =
{
1=#(M(b)) if k ∈ M(b)
0 if k ̸∈ M(b):
Whenever the set M(b) is single-valued, we refer to the candidate in this set as the
Winner of the election as the probability of this candidate winning the election tends
towards one as the number of voters tends towards inﬁnity.
For any vector b ⊂ B and any ballot c ∈ C, we let b+{c} denote the vector such that
one ballot c is added. Thus, given the vote proﬁle x, a voter with type t casts the ballot
c that maximizes his expected utility






W[k | b + {c}]ut(k):
Again, for ease of notation, we write Et[c] for Et[c | n].
Denition 1. We refer to  as an equilibrium of a nite Poisson voting game if for each
c ∈ C and each t ∈ T,
(c | t) > 0 =⇒ c ∈ argmax
d2C
Et[d]:
Nevertheless, as the focus of this work is on elections with a large number of voters, one
shall look at the limits of equilibria as the expected number of voters n tends to inﬁn-
ity. Thus, we refer to a large equilibrium sequence of to denote any equilibria sequence
{n}n!1 of the ﬁnite voting games of expected size n such that the vectors n are con-
vergent to some limit  as n → ∞ in the sequence. We refer to this limit  as a large
equilibrium. Furthermore, we refer to a sequence of outcomes in B by {Bn}n!1. The
limit b of a sequence of vectors {bn}n!1 in B is a vector of B.
We assume that each voter determines which ballot he casts by maximizing his expected
utility: a voter cares only about the inﬂuence of his own vote in determining the Winner’s
identity. As we analyze elections with a large number of voters, a voter’s action has no
impact in almost any possible outcome of the election. Indeed, it has some impact if and
only if there is some set of candidates involved in a close race for ﬁrst place where one
ballot pivotally changes the result of the election: a pivot4.
For some ballot c and a pair of candidates i and j, pivot(c;i;j) denotes the event that
adding one more ballot c can change the winner from candidate i to candidate j,
pivot(c;i;j) = {b ∈ B | W[i | b] > W[i | b + {c}] and W[j | b] < W[j | b + {c}]}:
4A discussion of the technical methods to compute such probabilities is out of the scope of this paper.
The interested reader might nd interesting the insights presented by Myerson [9], Myerson [10], Nu~ nez
[11] and Nu~ nez [12].
5Let pivot(i;j) denote the event in which there is a close race such that one additional






The event pivot(i;j) is the union of the diﬀerent outcomes in which one single ballot can
change the outcome of the election. Voters take into account only the probabilities of
these events in order to determine their best responses.
3 Sincerity of Approval Voting
Whereas the meaning of sincerity is clear in a rule like PV (a sincere voter simply votes
for his preferred candidate), it is not that simple in a rule like AV where the voter can
vote for diﬀerent candidates.
Denition 2 (Sincerity). A scoring rule ballot is sincere for a voter if, given the score s
assigned to some candidate k, the scores assigned to candidates preferred by the voter to
candidate k are greater or equal than s.
With such a deﬁnition of sincerity, there need not be anymore a dichotomy between
strategic voting and sincere voting. Indeed, this deﬁnition allows for several sincere AV
ballots.
Proposition 1. Sincere behavior of voters is guaranteed under Approval Voting in an
election with three candidates.
Proof. As in a Poisson game the voter knows that with strictly positive probability he
will be the only voter showing up the day of the election, it is strictly dominated not to
give one point to your preferred candidate under AV. Similarly, it is strictly dominated to
vote for his least preferred candidate with AV as it negatively aﬀects your expected utility
(voting for such a candidate may only prevent your two preferred candidates of winning
the election).
This result is not really “new” in the sense that elimination of weakly undominated
strategies or equilibrium reﬁnements such trembling-hand perfection lead to the same
result: sincerity of AV in three-candidates election. However, as will be shown throughout,
the current framework allows us to prove that the rest of the scoring rules are not sincere.
The remaining of this section presents a LPG with four candidates in which sincere
behavior of the voters under AV is not satisﬁed. The equilibrium is quite stable as we
do not specify the type distribution, only some general conditions for it to hold. Let us
6consider a LPG G in which four candidates K = {a;b;c;d} are running for the election.
Voters’ preferences are such that
ut1 = (10;2;1;3); ut2 = (1;10;2;3) and ut3 = (1;2;10;3):
Besides the distribution of types satisﬁes




It is not diﬃcult to see that voters’ best responses are not sincere with the strategy function
1 depicted as follows:
1 = ({a;b};{b};{c}):
Proposition 2. The strategy function 1 is a large equilibrium of the game H.
Prior to stating the proof of Proposition 2, next corollary illustrates a limit to the sincere
behavior of strategic voters under AV.
Corollary 1. Sincere behavior of voters is not guaranteed under Approval Voting with
more than three candidates.
Proof. In the equilibrium 1, the strategy function satisﬁes
1(a;b | t1) = 1(b | t2) = 1(c | t3) = 1:
Therefore, the vote distribution is such that
(a;b) = r(t1); (b) = r(t2); (c) = r(t3):
Given the vote distribution, the vote proﬁle x = (x(c))c2C is the following vector of random
variables
x(a;b) ∼ P(nr(t1)); x(b) ∼ P(nr(t2)) and x(c) ∼ P(nr(t3)):
In the equilibrium 1, the score distribution  = ((k))k2K is such that
(a) = (a;b) = r(t1); (b) = (a;b) + (b) = r(t1) + r(t2) and (c) = r(t3):
As the score distribution shows, the Winner of the election is candidate b. Finally, given
the score distribution, the score proﬁle s = (s(k))k2 K is such that
s(a) = x(a;b) ∼ P(r(t1)n); s(b) = x(a;b) + x(b) ∼ P((r(t1) + r(t2))n)
and s(c) = x(c) ∼ P(r(t3)n):
7In order to show that 1 is an equilibrium, we need to prove that the vote distribution
induces a probability distribution over the pivot outcomes in the election such 1 is a
best response for all voters. As shown by the computations included in the appendix, the
magnitudes of the pivot outcomes are ordered as follows:
[pivot(b;c)] > [pivot(a;b)] = [pivot(a;c)]
Taking into account the ordering of the magnitudes, one can determine the ballot that
each voter of a given type chooses. In particular, it is important to be clarify why t1-
voters do not vote for candidate d, a candidate they prefer to candidate b. As we assume
no one votes for candidate d, the only situation where voting for candidate d is pivotal is
when only a single voter votes. In this case, it is never optimal to vote for candidate d.
Indeed, whenever voting for d pivotally changes the outcome of the election it lowers the
probability of winning of the best-ranked candidates (a, b or c). Thus, no voter rationally
votes for candidate d. Formally, the expected utility of casting ballot {a;b} is strictly
higher than the expected utility for t1 voters of casting ballot {a;b;d}. Indeed, we can
write
∆ = Et1[a;b] − Et1[a;b;d]
However, the outcomes where adding candidate d has an impact in the outcome are the
ones where the score of each candidate is of at most equal to one (as no voter votes
for candidate d). Among these ones, there are two outcomes with positive probability
and where switching from ballot {a;b} to ballot {a;b;d} makes a change in the expected
utility: (0;0;0;0) and (0;0;1;0) where each coordinate stands for the number of votes
each candidate gets. Thus, we can rewrite the diﬀerence of expected utility as follows:




ut1(a) + ut1(b) + ut1(d)
3
)
+ P[x = (0;0;1;0)]
(ut1(a) + ut1(b) + ut1(c)
3
−
ut1(a) + ut1(b) + ut1(c) + ut1(d)
4
)
Then, the eﬀect of switching from ballot {a;b;d} to ballot {a;b} is located in two outcomes.
















(ut1(a) + ut1(b) + ut1(c)
3
−











Switching from ballot {a;b;d} to ballot {a;b} yields to a strictly positive gain in expected
utility for t1-voters.
8Repeating similar arguments for the diﬀerent ballots yields to the conclusion that is a
strict best response not to vote for candidate d for t1-voters. Furthermore, when a t1 voter
decides between casting ballot {a} and ballot {a;b}, he takes into account the inﬂuence
of adding candidate b. In order to do so, he cares about the most probable pivot outcome
involving candidate b: in this case, the one involving candidates b and c. Therefore, as a
t1-voter prefers candidate b rather than candidate c, he casts ballot {a;b}. Similarly, one
can show that the strategy function 1 is a best response to the information and so this
is an equilibrium.
4 The lack of sincerity of the other scoring rules
4.1 The Bad Apple
In this section, we reconsider a slightly modiﬁed version of the Bad Apple example of
Myerson [10] in which a candidate is unanimously disliked (the Bad apple). Let us consider
the LPG H in which there are three candidates K = {a;b;c} running for the election.
Voters’ preferences can be described by the type distribution:
ut1 = (3;2;0) and ut2 = (2;3;0);
with r(t1) = 0:5 and r(t2) = 0:5. All voters prefer candidate a and b over candidate c.
Proposition 3. Every scoring rule with 0:5 > s > 0 may lead to insincere behavior at
equilibrium.
Proof. It is simple to check that under the strategy function 2 with
2 = ({1;0;s};{0;1;s});
voters’ best responses are insincere as both t1 and t2 voters give s > 0 points to the least
preferred candidate c and 0 points to their middle ranked candidate (b and a respectively).
Besides the strategy function 2 is a large equilibrium of the game G whenever s < 0:5.
Indeed, as candidate c gets strictly less points than candidates a and b, the pivot between
candidates a and b is inﬁnitely more probable than the other ones conﬁrming that 2 is a
large equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Every scoring rule with s ≥ 0:5 may lead to insincere behavior at equi-
librium.
Proof. With the strategy function 3, both types of voters randomize as follows:
3({1;0;s} | t1) =
1 + s
3s




3({0;1;s} | t2) =
1 + s
3s




Voters’ best responses are insincere as both t1 and t2 voters give s > 0 points to the
least preferred candidate c and 0 points to their middle ranked candidate with strictly
positive probability. If voters anticipate that the most probable pivot outcome occurs
between candidates a and b, they respectively vote (1;0;s) and (0;1;s). However, as s is
greater than 0.5, this would imply that any pivot outcome in which candidate a or b is
included would also involve candidate c. As voters prefer their middle ranked candidate to
a lottery over the three candidates they deviate towards {1;s;0} and {s;1;0}. Given the
strategy function 3 (with s ≥ 0:5), the three candidates get the same expected score and
the pivot probabilities are not too diﬀerent (in the sense that their ratio tends towards a
positive ﬁnite constant as the size of the population tends towards inﬁnity). Therefore 3
is a large equilibrium of the game H. Myerson [10] analyzes the case of negative voting
(in which s = s = 1) and shows that 3 is a large equilibrium.
4.2 The Majority Preferred Candidate
It remains to be shown that the scoring rules in which s = 0 can lead strategic voters
to insincere behavior. In this section, we analyze a modiﬁed version of an example by
Nu˜ nez [12] in which a candidate ranked ﬁrst by the majority of the voters does not win
the election under AV. Let us consider the LPG I in which there are three candidates
K = {a;b;c} running for the election. Voters’ preferences can be described by the type
distribution:
ut1 = (3;0;1);ut2 = (1;3;0) and ut3 = (1;0;3);
with r(t1) = 0:1, r(t1) = 0:6 and r(t3) = 0:3.
Proposition 5. Every scoring rule with s = 0 and s < 1 may lead to insincere behavior
at equilibrium.
Proof. In the strategy function 4 with
4 = ({1;0;0};{1;s;0};{0;0;1});
voters’ best responses are insincere: t2 voters give s < 1 points to their preferred candidate
a and 1 point to their middle ranked candidate b. Furthermore, the strategy function 4
is a large equilibrium of the game G whenever s ≥ 0:5. Indeed, voters anticipate that the
pivot outcome between candidates a and c is the most likely one and then both t1 and
t2 voters give 1 point to candidate a to prevent candidate c from winning the election
and so do voters with type t3 by giving one point to candidate c. Besides t2 voters give
10s < 1 points to their preferred candidate b as it is dominated not to give any point to your
preferred candidate. Hence, any pivot outcome in which candidate b is included would also
include candidate a (as every voter that votes for candidate b also votes for candidate a).
Then, the most probable pivot outcome occurs between candidates a and c which proves
the claim.
5 Conclusion
This work presents a positive result concerning AV: it is shown that it is the unique scoring
rule that leads strategic voters to sincere behavior in elections with three candidates in
Poisson voting games. This result is in some way an extension of Brams and Fishburn
[2]’s result under dichotomic preferences. Indeed, if preferences are dichotomic (either you
like or dislike each candidate), AV leads to sincere behavior in natural way. However, the
sincerity of AV has two main limits. As we have shown, sincerity is not ensured under
AV in elections with more than three candidates. Furthermore, this sincerity does not
ensure reasonable preference aggregation as shown by Nu˜ nez [12] in Poisson games and
De Sinopoli et al. [3] with traditional equilibrium reﬁnements such as trembling-hand
perfection and Mertens-stable sets.
An interesting extension of the present work would be to understand whether in a
setting of information aggregation rather than preference aggregation (that is when voters
know some signal about the true state of the world), AV may ensure sincere behavior for
any number of candidates. Another interesting extension would be to set a comparison
of scoring rules in the Score Uncertainty model (Laslier [7]) in which AV ensures sincere
behavior of strategic voters under certain conditions.
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6 Appendix: Lack of Sincerity of Approval voting with four
candidates
We now provide the constrained minimization problems used in the proof of Proposition
2. The main theorems for the computation of magnitudes are included as supplementary
material.
Magnitude of a pivot between candidates a and b.
The Magnitude Equivalence Theorem or MET (see Nu˜ nez [12]) states that the magni-
tude of the pivot between candidates a and b coincides with the magnitude of the outcome
(s(a) = s(b) ≥ s(c)), i.e.
[pivot(a;b)] = [(s(a) = s(b) ≥ s(c))]
Therefore, the Dual Magnitude Theorem or DMT (see Myerson [10]) implies that this
magnitude is equal to the solution of the following optimization problem.
[(s(a) = s(b) ≥ s(c))] = min

(a;b)exp[3] + (b)exp[−1 + 2] + (c)exp[−3] − 1
12such that i ≥ 0 ∀ i. The solution of this constrained minimization problem entails that
the magnitude of the pivot outcome between candidates a and b satisﬁes





Magnitude of a pivot between candidates a and c.
Combining the MET and the DMT, the magnitude of a pivot between candidates a
and c is equal to





Magnitude of a pivot between candidates b and c.
Combining the MET and the DMT, the magnitude of a pivot between candidates b
and c is equal to
[pivot(b;c)] = [(s(b) = s(c) ≥ s(a))] = −(
√
r(t1) + r(t2) −
√
r(t3))2:
Therefore, the magnitudes of the pivot outcomes are ordered as follows:
[pivot(b;c)] > [pivot(a;b)] = [pivot(a;c)]:
13